How do Jews solve the delay?

49 Chapter 3 The Origin of the Nuremberg Laws On September 15, 1935, the German Reichstag passed the "Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor", the Reich Flag Act and the Reich Citizenship Act by way of acclamation. For this purpose, Parliament had been summoned to Nuremberg at short notice and met on the evening of September 15 to receive a declaration from the Chancellor and the reading of the Nuremberg Laws by Hermann Göring in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps and other high-ranking dignitaries. In order to promulgate the so-called Nuremberg Laws, the staffage of a public Reichstag session would not have been necessary, since the Enabling Act empowered the Reich Cabinet to issue statutory ordinances. Hitler's decision to convene the Reichstag in Nuremberg on September 9, just before the beginning of the party congress, 1 was a reaction to the incident in New York, which was played up by the German press, in which dock workers removed the swastika flag from the "Bremen" and had been acquitted by a Jewish judge.2 This "insult to the German nation" was attributed to the boycotts allegedly carried out by the Jews. The in itself meaningless process formed the trigger for the passing of the Nuremberg Laws. Goebbels noted in his diary: “Our answer: the Reichstag meets in Nuremberg and declares the swastika flag to be the sole national flag. Fuehrer is on the move. ”3 In the political understanding of the leading National Socialists, retaliation played a role that could hardly be overestimated. The demonstrative emphasis on the colors of the movement in the Reichsflaggengesetz was combined with the invective against the Jewish citizens to forbid them from showing the Reich colors. In the first version it said accordingly: “The 50 Reichsflagge is also the national flag. Only those who are of German blood belong to the German nation. «4 This implied a problematic definition of the term Jew, which has been hotly contested for years. Furthermore, the party leadership found the Reichsflaggengesetz (Reich Flag Act), for which a number of drafts were already in place, too meager for a full session of the Reichstag, so that Hitler commissioned drafts for "Jewish laws" which prohibit racial mixed marriages, sexual intercourse between Jews and non-Jews and a ban on employment for domestic workers under 45 years of age by Jews should contain. This constellation attracted a number of interested parties who seized the opportunity to realize their previously partially blocked ideas on the question of marriage bans, the denial of citizenship rights for Jews, and genetic health legislation. The informal deliberations that took place on the sidelines of the party congress ultimately led to the decision to regulate the pending questions in three different legislative proposals, while the regulations on marital health demanded by Artur Gütt, the head of the health department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, were excluded and in one An independent law should be enacted.5 Therefore, the decision was made to hastily complete the legislative proposals that had been in preparation for some time to prevent the marriage of Jews to non-Jews and marriage-like relationships. Thereupon a number of high officials of the Ministry of the Interior, who were concerned with the "Jewish question", were hastily summoned to Nuremberg and confronted with the task of creating approvable drafts from the numerous drafts that were in circulation.6 The provisions of the "Law for the Protection of the German blood and German honor «did not substantially go beyond the racist demands that were already virulent in the anti-Semitic discussion of the 1920s. The prohibition of racial mixed marriages was not only a demand of the NSDAP, but was also found in the civil right. It was already discussed in the negotiations on criminal law reform of 1933 51. As early as September 1933, both Roland Freisler, who later became President of the People's Court, and Reich Church Minister Hans Kerrl demanded the inclusion of a criminal provision against "racial treason" in the penal code.7 At this point, however, Reich Justice Minister Franz Gürtner had spoken out against a criminal ban on racial mixed marriages and asserted that such a law would affect the foreign relations of the German Reich, since Jewish married couples who were resident in Germany but were foreign citizens would be affected. Even Freisler recognized that regulation at the level of criminal law reform was impracticable.8 However, since the summer of 1935 the pressure from the radical wing of the party to ban racial mixed marriages had increased considerably, especially since the »Black Corps«, the SS The weekly newspaper Günter d'Alquens brought this demand to the fore after a series of court decisions, which had come about under massive pressure from local party activists, in favor of the separation of racial mixed marriages.9 At the same time, the newspaper referred to the Reichswehr Act of May 1935 , which contained a clause that excluded soldiers from active military service who had at least one Jewish grandparent or were married to a Jewish partner.10 Wilhelm Frick, who belongs to the radical anti-Semitic wing, now decided to impose a general ban on mixed marriages, and in anticipation of this, the registry office pointed out ter to postpone the legalization of such marriages because a new legal regulation is imminent.11 Nevertheless, the question arises why the corresponding legislation did not come into existence until autumn 1935. This was not least due to the demands of party circles to apply the Aryan paragraph contained in the statutes of the NSDAP, which even excluded individuals from membership who had only one Jewish great-grandparent and who traced the lineage back to 1800 Excessive demands from party and Gestapo circles for legal intervention against "racial treason" and "racial disgrace", for the dissolution of the existing mixed marriages, for criminal proceedings and the ambiguities in the mixed race issue prevented an agreement. The party demands were rejected by the responsible officials of the Reich Justice and Interior Ministry, mainly with arguments of practicability. In particular, the demand to legally dissolve existing mixed marriages met with massive resistance from the predominantly conservative civil servants who were aware of the far-reaching and grave legal and psychological consequences. Indeed, massive protests from the Christian churches were to be expected, and it had to be taken for granted that such a measure would lead to open disapproval among the population.13 The party demanded that eighths of Jews be included in the ban on marriage aroused even greater opposition the ministerial bureaucracy pointing out that it would affect more than a million people, the majority of whom were fully assimilated and had no ties to the Jewish community. The main interest of the officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior who were involved in the "Jewish policy" was to keep the number of groups affected by persecution and discrimination as small as possible and to limit the social impact, thereby indirectly supporting the segregation of the persecuted groups. The decision to regulate these legal matters on the occasion of the Nazi party rally did not resolve the factual conflicts that were not resolved by the general clauses contained in the "Blood Protection" and the Reich Citizenship Act. This was also due to their improvised creation. The officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, including its race officer Bernhard Lösener, could not fall back on the previous preparatory work in Nuremberg, especially since several departments were involved. A characteristic of the improvisation was the fact that the Reich Minister of Justice had not been brought in before the reading of the legal texts in the Reichstag. In the deliberations held parallel to the events of the Nazi Party Congress, in which Reich Health Leader Gerhard Wagner, Artur Gütt and Walter Groß were involved on the part of the party, Wilhelm Frick, State Secretary Stuckart and the Racial Officer of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Bernhard Lösener, were involved on the part of the government, it went into first and foremost about the contrast between the advocates of contagionism and the racial theorists who argue in genetic terms. The former, to which Gauleiter Julius Streicher, but also Reichsärzteführer Gerhard Wagner belonged in a prominent position, seriously believed that any sexual intercourse between Aryans and Jews would result in permanent poisoning of the Aryan blood and that consequently Aryan blood only through radical racial segregation "Blood purity" could be ensured. The more pragmatic direction advocated by Gütt assumed that by preventing any further mixing of Jews and Aryans, the proportion of Jewish blood would be leveled out and, in the long term, the racial homogeneity of the German people would be achieved, which both parties sought to achieve.14 Parallel to the "Blood Protection Act" Wilhelm Frick submitted a Reich Citizenship Law, which was only finalized during the party congress. The Reich Citizenship Law provided for the creation of a special Reich citizenship, which was only to be given to members of the national community of high quality and from which Jews and other racial aliens were excluded. In practice, this only resulted in the withdrawal of the right to vote, which was insignificant for Jewish Germans who could not vote anyway. The discussion about imperial citizenship went back to early planning. Such a solution had already been considered by State Secretary Hans Pfundtner at the beginning of July 1933.15 After the head of the Reichssippenamt Achim Gercke had already submitted the draft of a “race divorce law” and this idea had been taken up by the Advisory Council on Population and Race Policy, it finally came on April 17, 1935 under the direction of Gerhard Wagner to agree on a "draft of racial legislation" which was based on Nordic racial doctrine and, in addition to anticipating the provisions of the "Blood Protection Act," provided for tiered citizenship.16 The requirement that the mixed race be included in these regulations At that time it was already rejected by Lösener for practical reasons.17 The idea of ​​a Reich citizenship was already included in the first drafts, which were based on a uniform "law for the protection of the national preservation of the German people." 18 It is important that i In this first version the formula appeared, according to which Reich citizens were Reich citizens "German or related blood", which expanded the problematic term "German-blooded" without specifying the term Jew. Behind this was the conflict between different currents in the racist camp. The disputes between Gerhard Wagner and the representatives of the Reich Ministry of the Interior were primarily conducted over the delimitation of the group of people affected by the marriage bans and the restriction of Reich citizenship. Losener in particular tried to keep the group of persecuted people as small as possible and to exclude half and quarter Jews from it. The officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior tried to persuade Hitler to apply the "Blood Protection Act" only to full Jews, which failed, however, and tried to protect the assimilated Jewish groups in Germany as much as possible. In doing so, they indirectly supported the regime's policies aimed at racial segregation. On the hybrid issue, however, no agreement could be reached at the party congress between the representatives of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the party. Logically, this complex has been excluded for the time being. The three Nuremberg Laws were limited to general clauses and left the definition of the term Jews to the later implementing ordinances. At the solemn proclamation of the 55 laws by Hermann Göring this contrast was hardly noticeable. Goebbels had the radio broadcast interrupted before the laws were read out and instructed the party press not to discuss the laws until the implementing ordinances were issued. He hoped to be able to continue to enforce qualitative changes on the basis of the regulations. A definitive decision was postponed until a leadership conference in Munich was scheduled for September 24th. Hitler appeared, gave a lengthy speech, and then took the stand of the experts in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, who wanted to exempt half-Jews who did not belong to the Jewish religious community and second-degree mixed race from the law. However, Hitler was reluctant to make this decision public. Hence the trench warfare between the party and officials continued in the form of countless bills. The focus was on the question of which part of the half-Jews, provided they were not descended from three fully Jewish grandparents, should be defeated with the Jews. At the same time, Gütt suggested making a marriage between half-Jews and German-blooded people dependent on prior approval, which was in line with the ideas of the party representatives who were considering the establishment of racial courts.19 In contrast, the officials wanted to prevent any form of individual examination from which they were right expected an overflow of denunciations and spying. Even if Hitler dealt with the matter again on September 29, no agreement could be reached. It was only after lengthy negotiations that Hitler finally made a decision on November 6, 1935, which was largely in line with the drafts of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and only made a concession to the party in the secondary point of the marriage regulations for half-Jews, with the questionable notion that the marriages, which half-Jews were only allowed to enter into with Jews or half-Jews, would be largely sterile.20 The reasons for Hitler's hesitant attitude on this question were not that he did not sympathize with the contagionist doctrine. Rather, he was convinced of the political practicability of the ministerial proposals. The draft for a first implementing ordinance aimed at a schematic differentiation between Jews and non-Jews, in that half-Jews who were married to Aryan partners and had no relationship to the Jewish religious community automatically belong to the group of Aryans, as well as second-degree half-breeds if they were not belonged to a Jewish religious community. The officials argued that this rule would make the arbitration tribunal proposed by the party superfluous and would preclude ongoing disputes that would necessarily arise if, for example, the racial affiliation of half-Jews was made dependent on their later marriage wishes or, in certain cases, a race change through the separation of mixed marriages could occur. The two regulations21 could also help avoid further economic concern. The 200,000 or so half-Jews exempted from the law would become loyal supporters of the new state instead of resolute opponents. Likewise, a potential of around 45,000 fit men would be gained for military service. Finally, only a small number of exemptions would be required. Lösener tried to make the ministerial proposal palatable with the additional argument that it could serve as a model for other nations because of its clarity, simplicity and consistency. Hitler opened up to these proposals primarily for practical reasons. He was obviously aware that the inclusion of half-Jews and half-breeds in the law would considerably enlarge the persecuted group and would not remain without repercussions on the attitude of the majority population. The quantitative findings on this are not unambiguous, since the available statistical information differs, but it is likely that around 400,000 Jewish mixed race were involved. Without a doubt, their general inclusion in the persecution would have made the systematically striven for social segregation of the Jewish citizens considerably more difficult. Joseph Goebbels originally had high hopes for the renegotiations in September and November. In his speech at the party congress on 16.On September 9th, 1935, he declared to the assembled district and district propaganda leaders that the Jews could serve as a "very good bargaining chip" in future disputes and that the Jewish laws that had just been passed could not be changed "in the next month." 22 Now he noted in in his diary on November 15th: "A compromise, but the best possible", and added: "In God's name, so that rest may come." The matter should be launched "skillfully and inconspicuously" in the press. 23 For the radical anti-Semitic wing of the party, the outcome of the conflict represented a clear defeat, which, however, they were not necessarily ready to admit. Gerhard Wagner, co-founder and leader of the NS-Ärztebund, declared at the Nazi Party Congress of 1936 with his usual belligerence: “But for those who believe that the Jewish question has now been finally settled by the Nuremberg Laws for Germany and thus settled, let me say: The The struggle goes on. ”24 In fact, the Nuremberg Laws did not put an end to the contradictions in the“ Jewish question ”. The internally announced ordinances on the economic regulation of the position of Jews in economic life were suspended for the time being.25 Likewise, the already discussed tightening of the measures against civil servants, notaries and public servants was postponed.26 Furthermore, it was not possible to contain illegal attacks by the NSDAP and affiliated organizations lastly with regard to the Olympics, which forced the regime to show tactical considerations. The idea of ​​a man like Lösener to achieve a kind of aseptic solution through clear legal regulations and with a one-off cut and thereby shut down the "Jewish question" turned out to be a worrying illusion. The pressure exerted by radical party circles was soon to shift to the economic field. 58 The laws themselves met with a largely negative reception in Germany, although this did nothing to change the growing indifference of the majority population towards the fate of their Jewish fellow citizens. This attitude was linked with the hope, fueled by the propaganda, that the laws would prevent further wild attacks.27 By introducing a special Reich citizenship, which was automatically extended to the Austrians in March 1938, Frick sought the complications of a simple withdrawal citizenship for Jewish Germans would have meant, above all, to circumvent possible countermeasures by which the position of the German minorities in East Central Europe would have been impaired. His idea of ​​checking every German in front of a ruling chamber - this is where the term that became common in the post-war period first appeared - was downright adventurous, but reflected the illusion of being able to achieve a racially homogeneous people's cooperative. After the annexation of Austria, the "provisional" Reich citizenship was automatically granted, subject to a definitive regulation, which should be reflected in the handing over of the Reich Citizenship Certificate. But this did not happen. In fact, at the end of 1937, Hitler had ordered the postponement of the draft law prepared by Frick for the award of the Reich Citizenship Letter, after there had previously been considerable differences of opinion between the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the office of the Deputy Leader, which approved the awarding of the letter to first degree mixed race A year later the legislation was postponed again, this time at the request of the Fuehrer's deputy, who meanwhile relied on a new regulation of the nationality law in order to enforce his demands.29 In this respect, the initiative was Frick's, by means of the Reich Citizenship Law To arrive at an ethnically homogeneous national body in the long run has failed. Nonetheless, it served as a legal platform for a large number of implementing ordinances aimed at further restricting Jewish living space and indirectly preparing the "final solution". A withdrawal of citizenship was omitted for legal and tactical reasons, as counter-reactions from abroad were to be feared. However, Hans Globke, who was not involved in the drafting of the Nuremberg Laws, but became known through the commentary on the race laws written together with State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart, later took the path of a new regulation of the nationality law and stipulated that descendants from racial mixed marriages the German Should lose their citizenship.30 The events in the annexed and later the occupied territories in the east provided a boost. In the Warthegau and West Prussia, the general attribution of first-degree half-breeds to full Jews prevailed, but above all the downgrading of the Polish population, who were not considered capable of Germanization, to protection members of the Reich, as they were not prepared to grant them German citizenship after the annexation to lend. The ordinance on the German People's List, finally passed on March 31, 1941, which was based on Himmler's initiative, created the status of a Polish protected member with reduced national rights.31 In December, State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart was in a bad position for the Polish population in Warthegau and Danzig-West Prussia In 1940, pushing ahead with the proposal to generally revoke their citizenship from German Jews who had their place of residence in Germany or abroad and instead to make them “members of the Reich”. Legal considerations were decisive for Stuckart's proposal. He did not want to grant Jews a higher status than the Polish population remaining in the empire. With this plan, however, he met the declared resistance of the Reich Chancellery, for which Ministerialdirektor Kritzinger 60 declared that the expression "protection members" was not appropriate and that the Jews "will have disappeared from Germany in the not too distant future" .32 It was more appropriate to to declare the loss of German citizenship in the case of emigrated or expelled Jews. Hitler thought it nonsensical to protect the Jews in any way and therefore agreed with this view. Considerations by the departments involved to generally make the Jews who remained in Germany stateless, which affected privileged mixed marriages, also did not prevail. The draft of an Eleventh Ordinance on the Reich Citizenship Act, finally submitted in March 1941, once again provided for the loss of the citizenship of all Jews in the Reich, including Jews in privileged mixed marriages, but at the instigation of the Reich Chancellery, Hitler again vetoed interference with Apparently shied away from privileged mixed marriages and rejected bureaucratic individual regulations.33 The Eleventh Ordinance on Reich Citizenship of November 25, 1941 made the withdrawal of citizenship dependent on the relocation of residence abroad, whereby the Generalgouvernement should be regarded as foreign.34 From the point of view of the civil servants of the The Reich Ministry of the Interior had succeeded in protecting the Jews living in Germany from the immediate loss of property and for the time being excluded the problem of Jewish mixed marriages.35 All attempts laid down in the Nuremberg Laws had thus initially failed n Break down barriers to inclusion of Jewish mixed race in the persecution. Reinhard Heydrich's thrust, to achieve a change in the Nuremberg ordinances, arose from the experience that in East Central and Eastern Europe the criteria contained therein made little sense. In any case, he strove for the general inclusion of the mixed race of the first degree in the persecution, demanded the dissolution of the privileged mixed marriages and the deportation of the Jewish partners. However, this was again clearly rejected by Hitler in 1942, who repeatedly refused to touch the classification criteria of the Nuremberg Laws, although the motive of avoiding unrest among the German population may have had an effect.36 The mixed race question played with the Heydrich's gradually expanded authorizations on the "Jewish question" played an important role, with his aim being to gain classification power for the SS, which was reflected, for example, in the labeling obligation of September 1941.37 Heydrich's authorization of July 31st, issued by Göring In 1941, preparing the "final solution to the European Jewish question" was interpreted by him and Eichmann in this sense. At the Wannsee Conference, which was finally convened on January 20, 1942, the solution of the mixed race question was in the foreground of the discussions. Heydrich's aim was to implement an expanded definition of the Jews as the basis for the deportations and to win the support of the ministries involved for a corresponding demarche to Hitler. Therefore, after he had initially sketched the intended "overall solution", he presented a detailed list, which, as he said, followed the Nuremberg Laws "as a basis", but turned away from it in decisive points and first and second degree mongrels, unless they were taken to the retirement ghetto in Theresienstadt, which required "voluntary" sterilization. Heydrich, however, came across the declared contradiction of Wilhelm Stuckart, who, by pointing out the "infinite" administrative effort implied by Heydrich's suggestion, put the implementation of compulsory sterilization up for discussion, although it remains to be seen whether this was meant seriously or merely a tactical ruse was in order to obtain a respite.38 For this could not be achieved under war conditions. As a result, there was an in-depth discussion of the problem of mixed race and mixed marriages at the speaker level, which formed the subject of a renewed discussion on March 6, 1942 and ultimately how the Hornberger Schießen ended.39 A new attempt at the forced divorce from Privileged mixed marriages, some of which the SS had already practiced, 40 to regulate through an ordinance, was rejected by Hitler at the beginning of October 1943 and therefore shelved by the Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery, Hans-Heinrich Lammers.41 It is therefore the civil servants of the Reich Ministry of the Interior on the whole succeeded in exempting Jews living in privileged mixed marriages as well as first-degree Jewish mongrels who did not belong to the Jewish religious community or had other relationships with Jews or "Jewish descendants" from the direct measures of persecution. However, there have been efforts everywhere to narrow this legal scope. They were partially successful, and after the deportations began, the Gestapo circumvented the applicable regulations in many ways. As he explained in a letter to Gottlob Berger dated July 28, 1942, Himmler was not interested in a detailed legal revision of the Nuremberg Laws in order not to bind himself. This did not prevent the party institutions dealing with the "Jewish question" from further discussing the alternative between sterilization and deportation, 42 but with the onset of the deportations the "system of the Nuremberg Laws" was in any case in disintegration.43 Hitler's declaration in the Reichstag the passing of the Nuremberg Laws on September 15, 1935, that it was an attempt »through a one-off secular solution to perhaps create a level at which the German people can find a tolerable relationship with the Jewish people to be able to «, 44 must be seen as a tactical disguise, especially since it was associated with a threat to withdraw the settlement of the» Jewish question «from the Reich Ministry of the Interior. With regard to the "Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor", he threatened that "in the event of repeated failure, this problem would have to be passed on to the National Socialist Party by law for the final solution." With the first two laws, the Reichsflaggengesetz and the Reichsbürgergesetz (Reich Citizenship Law), a debt of thanks was paid to the movement.45 That probably related to the fact that they could be considered as fulfilling the program of 25 points, but behind this there was also the pressure, which had been exercised by the party in the negotiations. In the German public, the discriminatory clauses of the Blood Protection Act were insufficiently noticed and taken seriously. Overall, the impression arose that a certain consolidation had been achieved in relation to the Jewish citizens. Even on the part of those affected, certain hopes were raised that this would secure acceptable conditions for the continuation of Jewish life in Germany, albeit degrading in many respects. That was also a reflex of national socialist propaganda. At least there was a relative decline in Jewish emigration in 1936 and 1937. However, the hope for real relaxation was a chimera. As a result of Hjalmar Schacht's objection, further interference in the Jewish economy was temporarily averted, and direct attacks by the party on Jewish businesses and institutions were also largely prevented. But the implementing ordinances for the laws were not long in coming and, one by one, restricted the material living conditions of the Jews remaining in Germany. They stood at the beginning of a chain of restrictive and discriminatory regulations that were devised by the Jewish departments set up in the Reich ministries in a kind of race and that intervened in all areas of life. The emergence of the Nuremberg Laws reflects the political process within the Nazi regime. Far reaching and only limitedly compatible ideological objectives created a horizon of action within which tactical motives - such as the reaction to the flag incident in New York -, the interests of the party leaders responsible for racial issues, the ideas of the departments involved and the racial theorists came together to form an unstable compromise formula which, compared to the original extreme demands of the anti-Semitic hotspurs in the party leadership, allowed an administrative implementation. Amazingly, Hitler stuck to the compromise of the ordinance of November 11, 1935, which had been made after a long hesitation, to restrict the withdrawal of Reich citizenship, with modifications in detail, to German citizens with at least three Jewish grandparents. He did not do this because he would have cut back on the ultimate goal of ridding Germany of Jews. He chose this less unpopular route because he wanted to avoid friction and expected the problem to be solved pragmatically. This saved the comparatively small group of German Jews living in privileged mixed marriages from annihilation. Notes 1 S. Günter Neliba, The Legalist of the Unlawful State Wilhelm Frick. A political biography, Paderborn 1992, p. 203. 2 S. Peter Longerich, Politics of Destruction. An overall presentation of the National Socialist persecution of the Jews, Munich 1998, p. 102. 3 The diaries of Joseph Goebbels. All fragments, ed. von Elke Fröhlich, T. I, Vol. 2, Munich 1987, p. 512 4 Neliba, Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates, p. 151. 5 Marriage Health Act of October 18, 1935, RGBl. I, p. 1246; see Neliba, Legalist des Unrechtsstaates, p. 216. 6 S. Bernhard Lösener, Als Rassereferent in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, in: VfZ 9 (1961), p. 264 ff. as well as the critical evaluation of the Lösener's memories in Cornelia Essner , The ›Nuremberg Laws‹ or Die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933-1945, Paderborn 2002, pp. 367 f. 7 Cf. Lothar Gruchmann, “Blood Protection Act” and Justice. On the origin and effects of the “Nuremberg Law” of September 15, 1935, in: VfZ 31 (1983), p. 419. 8 Ibid., P. 422. 9 Ibid., P. 429 f. And Werner T. Angress, The Jewish question in the mirror of official reports 1935, in: Ursula Büttner (Ed.), Das Unrechtsregime. International Research on National Socialism, Vol. 2, Hamburg 1986. 10 Jeremy Noakes. Where do the mixed Jews belong? The emergence of the 65 first implementing ordinances for the "Nuremberg Laws", in: Büttner, Das Unrechtsregime, p. 71. 11 Neliba, Legalist des Unrechtsstaates, p. 202 f. 12 Ibid., P. 70 f. 13 Cf. Gruchmann, »Blood Protection Act«, p. 429 ff. 14 Cf. Essner, Die ›Nürnbergeretze, p. 15 ff. And 152 ff .; Neliba, Legalist des Unrechtsstaates, p. 200. 15 Ibid., P. 199 16 Essner, Die ›Nürnbergeretze‹, p. 89 f. 17 Neliba, Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates, p. 200. 18 Ibid., P. 206 In deviation from the Lösener's report, one must speak of Frick's active participation in the design work. 19 pp.Essner, Die ›Nürnbergeretze‹, p. 184. 20 Noakes, Judenmischlinge, p. 86. 21 First ordinance on the Reich Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935, RGBl I, p. 1333; First ordinance for the implementation of the Blood Protection Act of November 14, 1935, RGBl. I, p. 1334. 22 Goebbels speeches 1932-1945, ed. by Helmut Heiber, Düsseldorf 1971/72, p. 249. 23 Goebbels, Diaries, Part I, Vol. 2, p. 540; On October 1, in connection with the above-mentioned Fuehrer meeting, he had noted: “The Jewish question still not decided. We debate about it for a long time, but the Führer is still undecided ”, ibid. P. 520. 24 Reichsparteitag 1936, p. 153. Quoted in Essner, Die› Nürnbergeretze ‹, p. 672. 25 The publisher of the commentary by Hans Globke zu the Nuremberg Laws announced a corresponding amendment, which, however, did not appear. 26 Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, p. 115. 27 p. Ibid., P. 106 ff .; divergent David Bankier, Public Opinion in the Nazi State. The "Final Solution" and the Germans. A correction, Berlin 1995, p. 111; see Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p. 185. 28 Adam, Judenpolitik, p. 165. 29 Ibid., p. 187. 30 Ibid., p. 186. 31 Cf. ibid., p. 293 32 Ibid., P. 294 as well as Hans Mommsen, tasks and responsibility of the StS of the Reich Chancellery Dr. Wilhelm Kritzinger, in: Expert opinion of the Institute for Contemporary History, Vol. II, Stuttgart 1966, p. 381 ff. 33 Adam, Judenpolitik, p. 299 f. 34 p. Ibid., P. 300 f. 35 Ibid., P. 330 as well as Essner, Die ›Nürnbergeretze‹, pp. 530 f. 36 Adam, Judenpolitik, pp. 184 f., 196. 37 Cf. Essner, Die ›Nürnberger Gesetzes‹, p. 421 f. 66 38 p the "Wannsee Conference" (January 20, 1942), in: P. Longerich (Ed.), The Murder of European Jews, Munich 1989, p. 91 .; Adam, Judenpolitik, p. 323. 39 Aly, Endlösung, p. 270. 40 S. Adam, Judenpolitik, p. 329, note 132. 41 Ibid. 42 See the comprehensive analysis in Essner, Die ›Nürnbergeretze‹, p. 518 ff. 43 Ibid., P. 421. 44 Max Domarus (Ed.), Hitler. Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945, Vol. I, 2nd half-volume, Munich 1965, p. 537. 45 Ibid.